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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(j). 
The Browns have designated this case as having oral an 
argument priority of 14. See Rule 29, Utah R. App. P. A board 
of adjustment is not an administrative agency as defined in the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. In fact, the definition 
expressly excludes any administrative unit of a political 
subdivision of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l) (b) . See 
also Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 33 (Utah 
App. 1991); Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-07 
(Utah App. 1988) . The proper argument priority is 15. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although the Browns identify seven different issues for 
review, there is really only one fundamental issue, with two 
sub-parts, which is dispositive of the claims which they raise: 
1. Whether the decision of the staff of the Community 
Development Department of Sandy City ("Staff") 
administering and interpreting the zoning ordinance set 
forth in its Development Code to prohibit the short-
term rental of single family dwellings to transient 
guests on a nightly or weekly basis for periods of 
fewer than 3 0 days within the R-l single family 
residential zones is valid. 
2. Whether the Board of Adjustment's decision upholding 
that interpretation of the Development Code was correct. 
The determination of this two-part issue is a question of law in 
which the trial court's decision is given no deference, but in 
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which the City's decision is afforded considerable deference and 
a statutory presumption of validity. Patterson v. Utah County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah App. 1993); Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-9-708, 10-9-1001. 
The issue was preserved before the trial court in the City's 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, R. 150-
178, and in oral argument before the trial court. R. 3 60 
(transcript p. 11). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-701 - 708 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a land use case in which several property owners 
(referred to collectively herein as the "Browns") challenge Sandy 
City's interpretation of its zoning ordinance included as part of 
its Development Code to preclude the short-term rental of single 
family dwellings to transient guests on a nightly or weekly basis 
for periods of fewer than 3 0 days within the R-l single family 
residential zones. The claims arose from the City's attempts to 
enforce its zoning ordinance to preclude the Browns from using 
single family dwellings for short-term rentals to transient 
guests, rather than in the more typical procedural posture where 
an application has been made to the City for approval of a 
particular use which would require an evaluation of facts 
relevant to the use, e.g., for a conditional use permit or a 
variance. 
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The trial court's decision in this matter was rendered in 
the context of a petition for judicial review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-9-708 and 10-9-1001. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sandy 
City and the Browns have appealed. The nature of this Court's 
review of that judgment is similar to the standard applied by the 
trial court. In other words, this Court reviews the issues as 
though the appeal came directly from the Board of Adjustment 
decision. The same issues, therefore, are presented for this 
Court's review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because inquiry into the specific facts presented by the 
various plaintiffs' circumstances was not required for the City's 
interpretation of its zoning ordinance, the issues in this case 
are questions of law and statutory construction related to (1) 
Sandy City Staff's interpretation of the ordinance and (2) the 
decision by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment upholding that 
interpretation. Therefore, by its very nature, the statements of 
facts offered by both parties differ somewhat in character from 
those which the Court might normally review in a more typical 
case resolved on cross motions for summary judgment presenting 
different types of legal issues. 
While the parties may argue that the Court should draw 
different inferences from the facts presented, there are no 
genuine issues of fact which are material to the questions of law 
on which the trial court based its decision. Summary judgment 
was, therefore, appropriate and the sole issue before this court 
is whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion. 
3 
1. The zoning ordinance contained in the Sandy City 
Development Code ("Development Code") identifies the purposes for 
R-l-8 zoning. 
Residential District R-l-8 (a) Purpose. The 
Residential R-l-8 District is established to 
provide a residential environment within Sandy 
City that is characterized by moderate densities, 
a variety of housing sizes, a minimum of vehicular 
traffic and quiet residential neighborhoods 
favorable for family life. 
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City, 1988, § 15-7-5 (emphasis 
added), R. 154. 
2 . The Development Code provides that uses which are not 
expressly permitted in those ordinances are prohibited. 
Use of Land, Building and Structures. No land 
shall be used or occupied and no building or 
structure shall be designed, erected, altered, 
used or occupied for any use except those uses 
specifically permitted on the land upon which the 
building or structure is located or erected or use 
established as permitted in the regulations for 
the district in which said land is located. 
§ 15-21-11 (emphasis added), R.154. 
3. On various dates, Sandy City notified plaintiffs Steve 
Brown, Dennis Cloward and Joseph Bowers that the City's Community 
Development Department Staff had determined that their use of 
single family dwellings as short-term rental units was prohibited 
by Sandy City's zoning ordinance. R. 154. 
4. Plaintiffs appealed to the Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, challenging the Staff interpretation of the City's 
zoning ordinance. R. 154. 
5. In anticipation of the hearing before the Board of 
Adjustment, the Staff prepared memoranda and pre-hearing analyses 
for appeals by each of the plaintiffs, Steve Brown, Dennis 
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Cloward and Joseph Bowers, dated March 14, 1996. R. 180-183, 
enclosed at Addendum A. 
6. The memoranda and pre-hearing analyses set forth the 
basis for the Staff's determination that use of single family 
dwelling units in R-1 zones for rental to short-term guests is 
not permitted in R-1 zones. 
Basis for Staff Determination 
Staff asserts that there is substantial, rational 
basis for its determination that [plaintiffs'] use 
of the structures as places of public 
accommodation, renting them to short term guests, 
including nightly and weekly rental, is not 
allowed in the R-l-8 zone. The staff basis for 
its determination is as follows: 
1. First, staff reviewed the intent of the R-1 
zones which is to provide a residential 
environment within Sandy City that has a 
minimum of vehicular traffic and creates a 
quiet residential neighborhood favorable for 
family life. 
2. In order to accomplish this purpose, the City 
Council has designated specific uses which 
are allowed in the residential zones. All 
R-1 zones list the specific land uses which 
are permitted and which are allowed under a 
conditional use permit. Further, the Council 
has provided that short term guest facilities 
be placed in commercial zones (hotel/motel) 
or are strictly regulated within residential 
zones (bed and breakfast) only. 
3. The provisions and requirements contained in 
the Development Code are the minimum 
requirements for each zone. The code 
specifically indicates that property may not 
be used for any other purpose other than that 
specifically listed as allowed in the code. 
4. There is further support for the City's 
determination that using a single family 
dwelling as a rental facility for short term 
guests is different than its use as a single 
family dwelling in a variety of statutes and 
ordinances. These illustrate that such use 
is not considered to be single family 
dwelling but a place of public accommodation 
requiring different building standards, life 
and safety standards, tax implications and 
business licensing requirements. Among these 
are: 
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The Life Safety Code requires that 
facilities for short term guests (called 
lodging houses by the Life Safety Code) 
include additional escape, protection, 
alarm, fire separation, and 
extinguishment provisions that are not 
required in a building to be used for 
single family use. 
The state law authorizes the County to 
require rental facilities for short term 
guests renting for periods of 3 0 days or 
less (called transient rooms by the 
Sales and Use Tax Act) to collect and 
remit a special room tax to the State 
and County. Similar taxes are not 
imposed or authorized on persons 
occupying a private home for the purpose 
of residing for long periods of time. 
The Sandy City Business Licensing 
Ordinance requires anyone carrying on 
any business within the City to be 
licensed. Further, businesses are not 
to be carried on in residences unless 
they meet the qualifications for a home 
occupation license. Some of the 
qualifications include: 1. that the 
business must be accessory (secondary 
and incidental) to the primary use of 
the dwelling as a residence; 2. that it 
can only be carried on by a bona fide 
resident of the dwelling; and 3. that it 
does not interfere or disrupt the peace, 
quiet and domestic tranquility of the 
neighborhood by creating excessive 
noise, excessive traffic, nuisance 
(defined as annoying, injuring or 
endangering the comfort, repose, health, 
or safety of three or more persons), 
fire hazard, safety hazard or other 
adverse effects of commercial uses. 
5. Additional basis for the staff's 
determination that [plaintiffs'] use of the 
structure is not as a single family dwelling 
as contemplated by the zone is the way the 
owner[s] treat [] these buildings 
[themselves]. [They charge and collect] rent 
on a daily or weekly basis, [they schedule] 
tour buses and/or transport buses to stop at 
the house [s], [they have] business 
relationships with agencies to arrange 
rentals some of whom are transported to the 
dwellings by tour buses either to encourage 
them to promote the site or to deliver them 
or renters to and from the site. 
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6. Also, the neighborhoods are affected 
significantly differently than by the use of 
the structure as a single family dwelling, 
including: 1. late night, loud partying (both 
inside and outside the structure); 2. 
numerous vehicles entering and leaving the 
neighborhoods; 3. little or no responsibility 
or accountability by the occupants to those 
who their behavior is affecting; 4. 
strangers, constantly changing, in their 
neighborhoods; 5. no ability to develop 
community relationships with occupants. 
R. 181-82, Addendum A. 
7. On March 20, 1996, the Sandy City Board of Adjustment 
met to hear the appeal of plaintiffs Steve Brown, Dennis Cloward 
and Joseph Bowers. R. 206-291. A transcript of that meeting is 
attached to the brief of appellants as Addendum 4. 
8. The Board of Adjustment concurred with and affirmed the 
interpretation of the ordinances by the City's Development Staff, 
concluding that they "did not err and there is substantial 
rationale [sic] basis for the City's determination that the use 
of a dwelling as a place of public accommodation such as renting 
it on a daily or weekly basis, is not an allowed use in a single 
family R-l zone." R. 287. 
9. The parties agreed that the issues were appropriate for 
disposition on summary judgment and made cross-motions to the 
trial court. R. 102-04, R. 147-49. 
10. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Sandy City by Minute Entry on December 16, 1996, and entered its 
Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal on February 11, 1997. 
R. 333-37. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judicial review of a board of adjustment decision and a 
city's application of its zoning ordinances carries a statutory 
presumption of validity'and is afforded broad judicial deference. 
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board 
but will limit its inquiry into whether reasonable minds could 
have reached the decision that the board rendered. The same 
deference is given to interpretations of the zoning ordinance by 
the City's zoning staff. The decision of a board of adjustment 
is not subject to particular procedural standards but is 
supportable if the proceeding is orderly, impartial, judicious 
and fundamentally fair. 
The interpretation of Sandy's Development Code must be 
conducted by evaluating all of the relevant provisions of the 
zoning ordinance and applying them in a manner which is 
internally consistent. Sandy City's Staff conducted this type of 
evaluation and concluded that the short-term rental of single 
family dwellings to transient guests on a nightly or weekly basis 
for periods of fewer than 3 0 days in the R-l residential zones 
was prohibited. This interpretation, which was adopted by the 
Board of Adjustment, is reasonable, internally consistent and 
legally correct. 
It is important to bear in mind in this context that even if 
the ordinances in question and information presented during the 
administrative process and hearings may have also justified a 
contrary result, that does not render the decision arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal, or otherwise justify the Court 
substituting its judgment for that of local decision makers. 
8 
The trial court, therefore, properly concluded that the 
Board's decision was reasonable and appropriately granted summary 
judgment to the City. This Court, based on a correct application 
of the law, should reach the same conclusion and affirm the trial 
court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SANDY CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS ZONING ORDINANCES IS 
ENTITLED TO BROAD JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND CARRIES A STATUTORY 
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. 
A. WHERE A BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT REVIEW PROVIDES FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS THE BOARD NEED NOT APPLY A PARTICULAR STANDARD 
OF REVIEW. 
The Browns' lengthy argument notwithstanding, the issue of 
what standard the Board of Adjustment used in its review of the 
Staff interpretation of the applicable ordinances is a non-issue. 
The result of the Board of Adjustment review is that the Board 
adopted the zoning staff interpretation of the Development Code. 
The real issue before this Court is not whether the Board acted 
properly or improperly, but whether the staff interpretation, 
adopted by the Board, is correct as a matter of law.-7 
In addition, courts permit Boards of Adjustment considerable 
discretion in their review of zoning matters so long as the 
results of the review exhibit no illegality or impropriety. 
Because a zoning board is a body usually composed 
of persons without legal training, courts are 
reluctant to impose rigid technical requirements 
upon their procedure as long as they are orderly, 
impartial, judicious and fundamentally fair. 
- Contrary to the Browns' argument, the correct burden of proof and 
standard were identified by the development staff in its pre-hearing analysis 
for the Board of Adjustment. See Addendum A, footnotes 1 and 2. 
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McBride v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 579 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ind. 
App. 1991) . See also Anderson 4 American Law of Zoning, 3d 
(1986) § 22.01 at 3-6. 
Sandy's Board of Adjustment, like most others, is made up of 
persons without formal legal training who are not intuitively 
aware of the legal significance of terms such as "reasonable," 
"rational," or "rationale." Board members in this case were 
merely attempting to determine whether the staff interpretation 
of the zoning ordinance was proper or, in their terms, 
reasonable. The fact that the terminology might be construed to 
yield an inference that the Board applied an improper standard of 
review is really immaterial to the issue before the Court. So 
long as the procedure afforded to plaintiffs was "orderly, 
impartial, judicious and fundamentally fair," other procedural 
imperfections may properly be overlooked.-7 
B. THE JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW AFFORDS BOTH THE BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT AND THE ZONING STAFF SUBSTANTIAL 
DEFERENCE IN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF ZONING ORDINANCES • 
As a general matter, board of adjustment decisions which 
construe zoning regulations are afforded a presumption of 
validity. 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r d i n a n c e 
i s f o r m a l l y r e s p e c t e d by t h e c o u r t s , and t h e c a s e s 
s u g g e s t t h a t such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
g i v e n a t l e a s t a p r e s u m p t i o n of v a l i d i t y . 
- I t should be noted t h a t the remedy for an a l l eged p rocedura l e r r o r 
would be t o remand t h i s i s sue t o the Board of Adjustment for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
That would not serve the long-term i n t e r e s t s of any of the p a r t i e s t o t h i s 
case s ince the d e c i s i o n would l i k e l y remain unchanged and the a p p e l l a t e 
p rocess would begin anew to address the r e a l i s s u e , which i s t he c o r r e c t n e s s 
of the C i t y ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s zoning ordinance . J u d i c i a l economy would 
d i c t a t e t h e Court should avoid t h i s "red he r r ing" and decide the case on the 
b a s i s of the r e a l i s s u e which i s ma te r i a l to the r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s of the 
p a r t i e s . 
10 
3 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1996) § 19.12 
at 379. In Utah, board of adjustment decisions are clothed with 
a statutory presumption of validity and a court's review of those 
decisions is very narrow. 
The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the 
decision is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 602 (Utah App. 1995) (court should give 
"substantial deference" to board of adjustment decisions). This 
Court reviews a board of adjustment decision as if the appeal had 
come directly from the board and applies the same standard 
established for the district court's review. Patterson at 603. 
When a board of adjustment's decision turns on its interpretation 
of its zoning ordinance, that interpretation must be upheld 
unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation." L e w v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 570 A.2d 739, 746 
(D.C. App. 1990). 
Utah courts have accepted the premise that boards of 
adjustment should be given a "comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion" and that their decisions should carry a presumption 
of correctness. Patterson at 604 n.4 (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, we will not substitute our judgment 
on matters of public policy normally left to the 
Board's discretion; we will simply ensure that the 
Board proceeds within the limits of fairness and 
justice and acts in good faith to achieve 
permissible ends. 
Patterson at 604. See also Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt 
Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984) ("It does not lie 
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within the prerogative of the . . . court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board . . . " ) . "[C]ourts will not 
consider the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of the Board's 
zoning determination." Patterson at 604, n.5. 
Even at the staff level, administrative interpretations of 
zoning ordinances are given considerable deference. In re 
Duncan, 584 A. 2d 1140, 1144 (Vt. 1990) ("absent compelling 
indication of error," courts will sustain the interpretation of a 
zoning ordinance by the zoning board and staff). See also 
Appelbaum v. Deutsche 489 N.E.2d 1275 (NY 1985) (interpretation 
of a zoning ordinance by the administrative agency responsible 
for administering and enforcing the ordinance is entitled to 
great weight and judicial deference). 
It is axiomatic that a local zoning board is 
entrusted with a reasonable measure of discretion 
in the interpretation of its own ordinances and 
that the judicial function in reviewing a board's 
decision is a limited one. 
Bockis v. Kayser, 491 N.Y.S.2D 438, 439 (1985) (citations 
omitted). 
The Browns rely on Patterson in support of the contention 
that, because the interpretation of the zoning ordinance was in 
derogation of their property rights, any question in 
interpretation must be resolved in their favor. The citation to 
Patterson is narrow and taken out of context. Reviewed in the 
proper perspective, the Patterson citation does not support the 
Browns' position. 
The single sentence quoted by the Browns is accurate and, as 
far as it goes, correct. However, prior to and following that 
sentence, the Patterson court spent four pages of discussion 
12 
e s t a b l i s h i n g " s u b s t a n t i a l d e f e r e n c e " a s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d 
f o r r e v i e w i n g a b o a r d of a d j u s t m e n t d e c i s i o n . For example , 
f o l l o w i n g t h e q u o t e d s e n t e n c e , t h e c o u r t n o t e s t h a t p r o p e r t y 
owners h o l d t h e i r p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e 
p o l i c e power by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e body and t h a t t h e e x e r c i s e of 
t h a t p o l i c e power i n p r o m o t i n g p u b l i c h e a l t h , s a f e t y and w e l f a r e , 
i s a f f o r d e d a p r e s u m p t i o n of v a l i d i t y . P a t t e r s o n a t 6 0 6 - 6 0 7 . As 
d i s c u s s e d be low, u s i n g z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e s t o p romote i n t a n g i b l e 
v a l u e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s i n g l e f a m i l y r e s i d e n t i a l zones i s a v a l i d 
e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power . 
Whi le t h e i s s u e b e f o r e t h e Cour t i s a q u e s t i o n of l aw, t h e 
s t a n d a r d f o r r e v i e w i n g t h a t q u e s t i o n i s n o t p u r e l y a " c o r r e c t i o n 
of e r r o r " s t a n d a r d . In v iew of t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c r e t i o n and 
p r e s u m p t i o n of v a l i d i t y a f f o r d e d t h e Board of A d j u s t m e n t , t h e 
s t a n d a r d i s more of a " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " s t a n d a r d a b s e n t a showing 
of i l l e g a l i t y . P a t t e r s o n a t 604. 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t a s a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n a c o u r t ' s r e v i e w 
of a b o a r d of a d j u s t m e n t d e c i s i o n i s much b r o a d e r t h a n a r g u e d by 
t h e Browns. As a r u l e , a c o u r t r e v i e w i n g a l o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e s h o u l d g r a n t c o n s i d e r a b l e d e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
l o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , r e v e r s i n g o n l y i f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
u n r e a s o n a b l e , i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e o r d i n a n c e i n g e n e r a l , o r 
c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . - 7 In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e Board of 
- See Appelbaum v. Deutsch, 489 N.E.2d 1275, 1276 (N.Y. 1985) ("great 
weight and deference" given t o l o c a l agency c o n s t r u c t i o n of i t s o rd inance ) ; 
Levy a t 746 ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of zoning r e g u l a t i o n s by board of adjustment must 
be s u s t a i n e d u n l e s s p l a i n l y e r roneous ) ; Duncan a t 1244 ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n upheld 
absent compell ing i n d i c a t i o n of e r r o r ) ; S&M Investment Co. v . Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 702 F.Supp. 1471, 1473 (E.D. Cal 1988) ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must 
be " reasonable and s e n s i b l e " ) ; M i l l e r ' s Smorgasbord v . Dep ' t of Transp . , 590 
A. 2d 854 (Pa. 1991) ( loca l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n t r o l l i n g un le s s p l a i n l y 
er roneous or i n c o n s i s t e n t with the ordinance or enabl ing s t a t u t e ) . 
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Adjustment properly treated the staff interpretation of the 
zoning ordinances with deference. Likewise, the court should 
grant substantial deference to the local interpretation and 
reverse only if the interpretation is unreasonable, inconsistent 
with the ordinance in general or erroneous on its face. The 
Patterson court has provided guidance for the analysis in the 
present case: 
We must simply determine in light of the evidence 
before the Board, whether a reasonable mind could 
reach the same conclusion as the Board. It is not 
our prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. 
Patterson at 604 (citation omitted). 
II. SANDY CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS ZONING ORDINANCES IS 
REASONABLE, INTERNALLY CONSISTENT AND CORRECT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The rules of statutory construction are also applied in the 
context of interpretation of county and municipal ordinances. 
E.g., Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 
App. 1995); Clatsop County v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1393, 1395 (Or. 
1974). Three rules of construction are particularly important in 
the reviewing an interpretation of an ordinance. First, the 
interpretation must be based on the intent of the legislative 
body enacting the ordinance. Patterson at 606; Clatsop at 1395. 
That intent must be ascertained from the plain language of the 
ordinance. E.g., Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). 
If the intent is not clear from the language used in the 
ordinance, the court may find its meaning in the general purpose 
of the ordinance. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 
801 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Second, the ordinance must be construed as a whole to give 
effect to the overall policy or general purpose which it is 
intended to promote. Patterson at 606; Clatsop at 13 95; Gerald 
v. York, 589 A.2d 1272, 1274 (Me. 1991) (the ordinance should be 
construed in light of the objectives intended for the ordinance 
and its general structure as a whole). Accord Platts v. Parents 
Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Utah App. 1995). "This 
rule is especially applicable here because we are interpreting a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance." Clatsop at 1395-96. 
Third, an interpretation should be avoided if it renders any 
part of the ordinance meaningless, superfluous, void or 
insignificant. Terner v. Spyco, Inc., 545 A.2d 192, 197 (N.J. 
App. 1988); Czaikowski v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of the City of 
Milford, 540 A.2d 716, 178 (Conn. App. 1988). 
If a term is not defined in the ordinance, it is appropriate 
to rely on the interpretation of that term by the local zoning 
officials. Appelbaum at 1276. Even if a term is ambiguous, the 
zoning agency's interpretation should control if it is reasonable 
and sensible. Patterson at 604; S&M at 1473. Any interpretation 
of the ordinance should have as its objective "to construe any 
given word or phrase with due regard to its context, and to 
harmonize, if possible, the language under consideration with all 
other parts of the statute or ordinance." Warminster Township v. 
Kessler, 329 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. 1974) (emphasis added). 
These concepts are summarized in Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning: 
In determining the meaning of language, the 
court must look within the ordinance itself. If 
the language, read in its context, is unambiguous, 
15 
resort to the legislative history, such as minutes 
of the legislative body, is not permissible. 
In construing a zoning ordinance, as in 
construing any language, the words may not be torn 
from the sentence in which they appear, the 
sentence may not be read separate from its 
paragraph, and a paragraph or section may not be 
taken from its context. Specific language must be 
construed in the context of the entire ordinance 
so that all parts thereof may be given their 
intended effect, that the relations between terms 
may be understood, and that the ordinance may be 
construed as a harmonious whole. 
Young § 18.10 at 238-40 (emphasis added). 
Fundamental to the question before the Court is whether the 
short-term rental of single family dwellings on a nightly or 
weekly basis to transient guests is a use which is compatible 
with the general purpose of a single family residential zone. I 
is apparent that the concept of residential zoning goes well 
beyond simply defining the physical structures which are 
permitted in that zone. It is an issue of whether the use in 
question is compatible with what one perceives to be the 
character of a single family residential neighborhood. The 
propriety of using zoning ordinances to secure the integrity of 
neighborhoods, including the promotion intangible social values 
and maintenance of a family environment, is well established. 
Ziegler, 2 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning 4 ed (1988) 
§17A.02 at 17A-4,5. These zoning regulations clearly fall withi 
the scope of a municipality's police power to promote the genera 
welfare. Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of 
police power regulation of single family residential areas goes 
beyond simply structural controls. 
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The police power is not confined to elimination of 
filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample 
to lay out zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and 
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 
1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), cited with approval in City of 
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc, 514 U.S. 725, 115 S.Ct. 1776, 1781, 
131 L.Ed.2d 801 (1995) . It is also important to keep in mind 
that limits on transient occupancy of single family residential 
dwellings are not unconstitutional. See Cope v. City of Cannon 
Beach, 855 P.2d 1083 (Or. 1993). 
A recent California case dealt with issues similar to the 
one before this Court. Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 
Cal.Rptr. 382 (Cal. App. 1991), review denied, U.S. certiorari 
denied, 504 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1950, 118 L.Ed.2d 554 (1992). In 
Ewing, the plaintiff challenged an ordinance which prohibited 
short-term rentals of residential property to transient tenants. 
While Sandy City's Development Code is structured differently by 
providing that a use which is not specifically permitted is 
therefore prohibited, the analysis and rationale in Ewing are 
nonetheless applicable and helpful in the present case. 
In Ewing, the City Council had found that use of a single 
family residence for transient lodging was inconsistent with the 
purpose of the residential zoning. Ewing at 387. The city had 
determined that the commercial nature of such use of the 
properties created adverse impacts including traffic, parking, 
noise and other problems. In an attempt to create a factual 
dispute, the plaintiff presented evidence which challenged those 
factual determinations. The Ewing court ignored these factual 
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disputes and focused on whether the plaintiff's use of the 
property was compatible with the city's purpose in enacting a 
residential zone to "enhance and maintain the residential nature 
of the City." Ewing at 388. 
The Ewinq court's rationale applies to the present case as 
well. 
[T]he maintenance of the character of residential 
neighborhoods is a proper use of zoning. ... 
[W]ith home ownership comes stability, increased 
interest in the promotion of public agencies, such 
as schools and churches, and "recognition of the 
individual's responsibility for his share in the 
safeguarding of the welfare of the community and 
increased pride in personal achievement which must 
come from personal participation in projects 
looking toward community betterment." 
k ic -k k -k 
Whether or not transient rentals have the other 
"unmitigable, adverse impacts" cited by the 
Council, such rentals undoubtedly affect the 
essential character of a neighborhood and the 
stability of a community. Short-term tenants have 
little interest in public agencies or in the 
welfare of its citizenry. They do not participate 
in local government, coach little league, or join 
the hospital guild. They do not lead a Scout 
troop, volunteer at the library, or keep an eye on 
an elderly neighbor. Literally, they are here 
today and gone tomorrow--without engaging in the 
sort of activities that weld and strengthen a 
community. 
Ewing at 388 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
The Ewing court distinguished between transient use of 
residential property and month-to-month tenancies where the 
tenants may intend to remain longer. "Indeed, long-term tenants 
may create as stable a community as resident homeowners." Id. at 
390. The court held that prohibiting rentals for a term of less 
than 3 0 days was appropriate to meet the city's goal of 
preserving the residential nature of its communities. Id. 
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The case law cited by the Browns is not controlling in the 
case at bar. State v. Door County Bd. of Adjustment, 371 N.W.2d 
403 (Wis.App. 1985), for example, deals with ownership and 
occupancy of a single family dwelling by 13 families, not 
transient tenancy as presented here. The Ewing rationale would 
be consistent with State v. Door because the owners would have 
long-term interest in the properties, even though their period of 
tenancy might be periodic rather than continuous. 
City of Portland v. Carriage Inn, 676 P.2d 943 (Or.App. 
1984), contains language inconsistent with plaintiffs' argument: 
Even if it is still true that a zoning law or 
ordinance, being in derogation of the common law 
rights of property owners, should be strictly 
construed in their favor, the primary function of 
the courts is to discern and declare the intent of 
the legislative body. 
City of Portland at 944 (emphasis added). The Oregon Court of 
Appeals interpreted the specific provisions of the city's 
ordinance to reach its conclusion. It appears from the analysis 
that the ordinance in question did not contain a provision, 
similar to that which is controlling in the present case, that a 
use which is not expressly permitted is prohibited. 
Strauss v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 608 A.2d 1105 (Pa. 1992) 
deals with an application of the zoning ordinance to determine 
that a property owner's use of the property was "not a legal 
nonconforming use." As mentioned at the outset here, plaintiffs' 
case is not one which is based upon a nonconforming use. The 
rationale in Strauss clearly does not apply here. 
Other cases cited by the Browns deal with the composition of 
a "family." That discussion simply is not at issue here. The 
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City is not attempting to limit occupancy by classifications of 
individuals. Rather the City's interpretation of its Development 
Code addresses the issue of use. If a single family residence 
were rented for two weeks to a traditional family--father, mother 
and accompanying children--the use would nonetheless be 
prohibited as a rental for 30 days or less.-7 
The Browns also cite Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp. in 
support of their position. There are two obvious weaknesses with 
this argument. First, Town of Alta dealt with whether the 
plaintiffs had established an accessory use which amounted to a 
prior nonconforming use of their property at the time the City 
annexed the property. The Browns have never argued that their 
use of their property is a prior nonconforming use. Nor do the 
facts support such an argument. Second, the Browns rely on 
discussion by the dissent which is clearly not controlling law in 
this matter. 
In the present case, the Sandy City Staff was faced with a 
simple question: Is the rental of houses to transient guests, on 
a nightly or weekly basis for periods of thirty (30) days or 
less, permitted in R-l zones within Sandy City? The Staff 
determined that plaintiffs' use of the properties was essentially 
for public accommodations and that "using structures built as 
single family dwellings as places of public accommodation, 
renting them to short-term guests (nightly and weekly), is not a 
use allowed within the R-l-8 Zone." See Exhibit A. 
- Illustratively, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-31-4, defining "transient" 
as occupying premises such as public accommodations for fewer than 30 
consecutive days for purposes of imposing a transient room tax. 
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In reaching their conclusion, the Staff relied on two key 
elements from the City's Development Code, contained in the 
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City. First, the Code clearly 
provides that if a use is not expressly permitted in the Code, 
then it is prohibited. Second, the Code unambiguously identifies 
the purpose for which residential districts were established. 
The Staff reviewed the nature of short-term rentals of dwelling 
units to determine that (1) they are not expressly permitted by 
the Development Code and are therefore prohibited; and (2) they 
are incompatible with the purposes for which residential zoning 
was established. 
Combining that fundamental analysis with the fact that 
short-term rental of living quarters, which is the business 
conducted by the Browns, is generally subject to restrictions and 
conditions not applicable to other traditional longer term 
residential uses of single family dwellings in a residential 
district, it is clearly reasonable for the Development Staff to 
have concluded that the use of the dwellings by the Browns is not 
permitted by the ordinance or compatible with the character of 
the single family residential districts. 
It is important to consider this issue in the context of the 
overall framework of the City's Development Code. Because it 
provides that uses which are not expressly permitted are 
prohibited, it obviates any requirement to single out particular 
uses to be expressly excluded by the ordinance. This would make 
the general provision meaningless and require that the City 
attempt to identify for each zone in the Development Code all 
uses which might be considered prohibited. The risk in this 
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approach is that if an objectionable use is overlooked in the 
process, it would not be expressly prohibited and would, 
therefore, be permitted, a result which the City attempted to 
avoid in drafting its code. 
While the term "short-term," as used in the context of 
residence or rentals, is not specifically defined by the 
Development Code provisions related to single family residences, 
that does not mean that the Staff interpretation is incorrect or 
that an interpretation cannot be made. First, the Staff is 
afforded substantial deference in its interpretation and 
application of terms, even though not specifically defined in the 
ordinance or if the terms are ambiguous. Second, the short-term 
rental of guest facilities is addressed in other areas of the 
Development Code. Reviewing the Browns' short-term rentals in 
the context of the stated purpose of the Development Code and 
other parts of the Code which address the commercial nature of 
such short-term rentals leads to the reasonable conclusion that 
these short-term, transient uses are not contemplated to be 
"residential" in character as identified by the ordinance. 
Third, the use of single family dwellings for short-term rentals, 
essentially a commercial activity, is not expressly permitted in 
an R-l zone. Therefore it must, under the provisions of the 
Development Code, be prohibited. 
The Development Staff's conclusion that short-term rentals 
to transients are not permitted under the ordinance is not 
inconsistent with the common practice of renting single family 
dwelling units on a month-to-month basis. The key to the 
distinction, as discussed in Ewing, lies in the concept of 
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residence. Generally, where a person resides at a location with 
the intent to remain for an extended period, that is his 
residence. One is generally said to reside at the place which he 
intends to be his principal place of residence. E.g., Allen v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978). One who 
rents a house on a month-to-month basis generally intends to 
reside at that house for more than the term of the rental. One 
can be a month-to-month tenant in a particular house for years. 
Where an individual rents a single family dwelling for a 
night, a week, or even a month, with the intent to return to his 
permanent place of residence at the end of the rental term, he 
can hardly be termed a "resident" in the short-term rental house 
as that concept is normally understood. Interpreting Sandy's 
ordinance to preclude short-term rentals to transient tenants who 
do not wish to establish the rental dwelling as their principal 
place of residence while permitting month-to-month tenancies in a 
similar single family dwelling in an R-l zone where the tenant 
intends that to be his principal place of residence is not 
facially inconsistent nor is it unreasonable. 
In order to prevail on this matter, the Browns must show 
that the Staff interpretation of the Development Code is 
unreasonable or inconsistent with other provisions of the Code. 
It is not enough that they show that their interpretation of the 
Code provisions may also be reasonable. Given the presumption of 
validity of the Board of Adjustment decision and the substantial 
deference given to the Staff interpretation of the statute, a 
"tie" goes to the City. E.g., Patterson at 604. If the Browns' 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s e q u a l l y a s r e a s o n a b l e a s t h e C i t y ' s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e C i t y must p r e v a i l . - 7 
The Browns, however , a r e u n a b l e t o p r e s e n t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
which i s r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . To f i n d t h e Browns ' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o be r e a s o n a b l e , t h e Cour t would have t o i g n o r e 
t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e Development Code which p r o v i d e s t h a t u s e s 
which a r e n o t e x p r e s s l y p e r m i t t e d a r e p r o h i b i t e d o r t h e Browns 
would have t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e i r u s e i s e x p r e s s l y p e r m i t t e d 
by t h e Code. The Cour t would a l s o have t o f i n d t h a t s h o r t - t e r m 
r e n t a l s t o t r a n s i e n t t e n a n t s i s a u s e c o n t e m p l a t e d by and 
c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e p u r p o s e s b e h i n d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
r e s i d e n t i a l z o n e s . The Browns a r e s i m p l y u n a b l e t o meet t h e i r 
b u r d e n i n t h i s c a s e . 
Because t h e Development S t a f f ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 
Development Code i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i s r e a s o n a b l e , i s c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h e o r d i n a n c e , i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e 
g e n e r a l p u r p o s e of r e s i d e n t i a l zon ing and i s n o t f a c i a l l y 
e r r o n e o u s , i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o r r e c t a s a m a t t e r of l aw . The 
Board of Ad jus tmen t was c o r r e c t i n a d o p t i n g t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
- I t i s important t o keep in mind t h a t t h e r e i s a l s o a p o l i t i c a l 
component t o t h e s e i s s u e s . I t i s apparent t h a t the Browns b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i r 
use of t h e i r r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s should be permi t ted in r e s i d e n t i a l zones . 
This be ing the case , they should make t h e i r p o l i t i c a l arguments for having the 
d e f i n i t i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l zoning changed to inc lude t h e i r u se . If t he c i t y 
counc i l does not agree , they can work t o change the c i t y counci l by e l e c t i n g 
members who suppor t t h e i r p o s i t i o n . This i s no t , however, a mat te r for the 
Court . The Court need determine only whether the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
Development Code i s reasonable and, t h e r e f o r e , c o r r e c t . 
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III. SANDY CITY HAS NOT "AMENDED" ITS ORDINANCES BUT HAS SIMPLY 
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE EXISTING PROVISIONS OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT CODE. 
Sandy City in this case has merely reviewed all of the 
existing provisions of its Development Code, reached a conclusion 
as to its application and applied the Code provisions to the 
Browns' use of their properties. The Browns argue that the 
Development Code is unambiguous and that the City's 
interpretation reads into the Code language which is not there. 
They urge the Court to apply strict construction to this 
unambiguous language of a very small portion of the Development 
Code, excluding any other applicable language in the Code, to 
reach the conclusion they seek. 
The difficulty with the Browns' position is that they imply 
that the Court should ignore the rules of statutory construction 
to apply strict construction to that small excerpt of the Code. 
They don't want the entire Development Code to be applicable to 
them. 
The City, by contrast, has reviewed the unambiguous language 
of the entire Development Code to conclude that because the 
Browns' use of the residential dwelling units is not expressly 
permitted by the Development Code, it is prohibited. Applying 
the strict construction urged by the Browns to the entire 
Development Code, as required by the rules of statutory 
construction, the Court must conclude, as set forth in the Code, 
that a use which is not specifically permitted is prohibited.-7 
-' The City does not agree that strict construction is the appropriate 
standard for construing the Development Code. It merely points out here that, 
if strict construction were appropriate, Browns' use of the properties would 
still be prohibited. 
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The Browns have not demonstrated that their use of residential 
dwelling units for short-term rentals is specifically permitted 
by the Development Code. Even such a "strict construction" would 
lead to the conclusion that the short-term rentals are 
prohibited. 
IV. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY IN 
INTERPRETING THE STATUTE NOR IS ITS INTERPRETATION 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Board of Adjustment exceeded its 
authority by creating a new zoning classification with its 
adoption of the staff interpretation of the City's ordinances and 
that the Board's interpretation is unconstitutionally vague. 
Neither argument creates a legitimate issue before this Court. 
The Board of Adjustment in this case merely entertained an 
appeal from a decision interpreting and applying a zoning 
ordinance, as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-704. Its action 
was clearly within the scope of the enabling statutes. There is 
no support for the proposition that the Board's affirmation of 
the Staff's interpretation was somehow a legislative act which 
created a new zoning classification. It is unreasonable to 
conclude that the Board exceeded its authority. 
A similar superficiality plagues plaintiffs constitutional 
argument. The issue of vagueness and its constitutional 
implications apply to statutes and ordinances, not to 
interpretations or applications of those statutes or ordinances. 
Plaintiffs have not challenged the constitutionality of the 
zoning ordinances in question, either facially or as applied to 
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their circumstances.- Rather they cite case law addressing 
vagueness of statutes and make the quantum leap in logic that an 
interpretation of a statute equates to passing an 
unconstitutionally vague statute. They cite no authority to 
support this type of analytical sleight of hand. Their 
constitutional arguments are without merit and inapplicable to 
the case before the Court. 
V. Mh AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Under a heading claiming that the City altered the law by 
fiat, the Browns make what is essentially an estoppel argument, 
i.e., that the City should be bound by its prior actions or the 
prior interpretation of its Development Code by some of its 
employees. 
As a general rule, equitable estoppel is not applicable 
against governmental entities. E.g., Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & 
Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). The only exception to this 
general rule arises where (1) application of the estoppel 
doctrine is necessary to prevent manifest injustice, (2) the 
exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired, and (3) 
there is no substantial adverse effect on public policy. 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994); Sutro at 718. This 
exception is not liberally applied. 
In cases where such an issue arises, the 
critical inquiry is whether it appears that 
the facts may be found with such certainty 
and the injustice to be suffered is of 
sufficient gravity to invoke the exception. 
As noted above, measures to limit short-term rentals to transient 
tenants in single family residential zones are not unconstitutional. 
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Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 792 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Also, in order to prevail on an equitable estoppel claim 
raised against a zoning body, a plaintiff must show exceptional 
circumstances justifying the estoppel. Town of Alta at 802; Utah 
County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981). Simply failing to 
enforce a zoning ordinance for a period of time does not suffice 
to estop future enforcement. Town of Alta at 803. An example of 
"exceptional circumstances" is "intentional discriminatory 
application of the ordinance." Baxter at 65. The Browns have 
shown no such exceptional circumstances. 
It is also essential that the conduct or statements relied 
upon as a basis for estoppel come from an individual who is in a 
position to bind the city. Town of Alta at 803, citing Morrison 
v. Home, 12 Utah 2d 131, 363 P.2d 1113, 1114 (1961) ("It would 
be unreasonable and unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a 
ministerial officer having no authority to do so, could bind the 
county to a variation of a zoning ordinance . . . " ) / Lehman v. City 
of Louisville, 967 F.2d 1474, 1477 (10th Cir. 1992) ("'A party 
cannot state a claim for relief under a theory of estoppel 
against a state or local government entity on the basis of an 
unauthorized action or promise.' The officials that spoke with 
appellants simply lacked the authority to bind the City Council 
in any way." (citation omitted)). 
The Browns have failed to allege a sufficient basis for 
invoking estoppel against the city, i.e. that application of the 
doctrine is necessary to prevent manifest injustice, that the 
exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired, and that 
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there is no substantial adverse effect on public policy. Lacking 
these essential allegations, the Browns fail to state a claim 
under Utah law. 
Assuming the facts as alleged by the Browns in their 
complaint most favorably to them, Sandy City is entitled as a 
matter of law to summary judgment in its favor on the estoppel 
issue. An "over-the-counter" inquiry yielding affirmative 
statements from a clerk or ministerial officer who does not have 
authority to deviate from the applicable zoning ordinances simply 
lacks the requisites to form the basis for estoppel against the 
city. None of the exceptions to the general rule avoiding 
application of estoppel to the city apply in this case. 
Plaintiffs may not, therefore, prevail on the basis of equitable 
estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue which the Court need address and decide is 
whether Sandy City's interpretation and application of its 
Development Code as prohibiting the short-term rental of single 
family dwelling units within an R-l zone is correct. The Board 
of Adjustment decision carries with it a statutory presumption of 
validity and considerable judicial deference. Though the issue 
presents a question of law, the appropriate standard is not a 
correction of error standard, but an evaluation of reasonableness 
and whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
The City's Staff properly analyzed and applied the 
provisions of the City's ordinances in light of the general 
purpose of establishing residential zones to conclude that the 
short-term rental of single family dwellings in R-l zones is 
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prohibited by those ordinances. This interpretation is 
reasonable, consistent with other provisions of the ordinance and 
not facially erroneous. 
The Browns have failed to meet their burden to overcome the 
deference afforded to the City's decision or to rebut the 
statutory presumption of validity in favor of the Board of 
Adjustment decision. Nor have they made a showing to support 
application of equitable estoppel against the City. They have 
failed to demonstrate that the City's application of its 
Development Code is arbitrary, capricious, illegal or even 
unreasonable. At best, they have argued that there is an 
alternative interpretation of the Development Code which might 
also be viewed as reasonable. As a result, it cannot be 
concluded that the City's interpretation is not reasonable and 
the summary judgment granted by the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this s^/p^h^y of September, 1997. 
WILLIAMS 8c HUNT 
By 
JodV K Bu^hbtt 
Attprjneysi/for Appe l lees 
51075.1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of September, 1997, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellees Sandy City and Sandy City Board of Adjustment were 
mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, to J. Craig 
Smith, NIELSEN & SENIOR, 1100 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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ADDENDUM A 
MEMORANDUM 
Pre-He^i'iiij" Analysis 
March 14, 1996 
To: Sandy City Board of Adjustment 
From: Community Development Department 
Subject: Steve Brown Alleged Error Request 
10175 South Buttercup Drive 
9940 South Roseboro Road 
BO; \ # 96-01 
Request 
Steve Brown, who owns or controls property located at iui7^ South Buttercup 
Drive and 9940 South Roseboro Road, which are located in the R-l-8 zone, has 
filed a request that the Board of Adjustment determine that City Staff erred in their 
decision that Mr. Brown's practice of using the homes as places of public 
accommodation, renting his houses to short term guests (nightly and weekly), is not 
allowed in R-l zones in Sandy City. 
Mr. Brown is being represented by Craig Smith, an attorney for Nielsen & Senior, 
who has set forth the basis for their appeal in a letter dated January 15, 1996, which 
is included in your packet. 
Staff Determination under Appeal 
It has been determined that using structures.built as single family dwellings as places 
of public accommodation, renting them to short term guests (nightly and weekly), is 
not a use allowed within the R-l-8 Zone. 
Legal Standard to be Met at Public Hearing 
Section 10-9-704(3) Utah Code Annotated (1995)1 (hereinafter UCA) and Section 15-
5-8(B) Revised Ordinances of Sandy City1 (hereinafter ROSQ require that the 
applicant shall bear the burden of proving that an error has been made. It is presumed 
*The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving t^ c(|. 0 1 ^ 0 
an error has been made." (UCA, §10-9-704(3)). 
uThe person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving that 
an error has been made." (Revised Ordinances of Sandy City, 19 96, §15-5-8-B). 
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until proven otherwise that the determination made by the City Staff or Planning 
Commission is valid. To fulfill his burden of proof, Mr. Brown must establish that 
the staff had no rational basis for its decision. 
Basis for Staff Determination 
Staff asserts that there is substantial, rational basis for its determination that Mr. 
Brown's use of the structures as places of public accommodation, renting them to 
short term guests, including nightly and weekly rental, is not allowed in the R-l-8 
zone. The staff basis for its determination is as follows: 
1. First, staff reviewed the intent of the R-l zones which is to provide a residential 
environment within Sandy City that has a minimum of vehicular traffic and 
creates a quiet residential neighborhood favorable for family life3. 
2. In order to accomplish this purpose, the City Council has designated specific uses 
which are allowed in the residential zones. All R-l zones list the specific land 
uses which are permitted4 and which are allowed under a conditional use permit. 
Further, the Council has provided that short term guest facilities be placed in 
commercial zones (hotel/motel) or are strictly regulated within residential zones 
(bed and breakfast) only. 
3. The provisions and requirements contained in the Development Code are the 
minimum requirements for each zone. The code specifically indicates that 
property may not be used for any other purpose other than that specifically listed 
as allowed in the code5. 
4. There is further support for the City's determination that using a single family 
dwelling as a rental facility for short term guests is different than its use as a 
single family dwelling in a variety of statutes and ordinances. These illustrate that, 
such use is not considered to be single family dwelling but a place of public 
accommodation requiring different building standards, life and safety standards, 
tax implications and business licensing requirements. Among those are: 
3
 §15-7-5 Residential Di s tr i c t R-l-8 (a) Purpose. The Resident ia l R-l-8 
D i s t r i c t i s e s t a b l i s h e d to provide a r e s i d e n t i a l environment wi th in Sandy Ci ty 
t h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by moderate dens i t i e s , - a v a r i e t y of housing sizes^ a 
minimum of veh icu la r t r a f f i c ' and quie t r e s i d e n t i a l neighborhoods favorable for 
family l i f e , (emphasis added, l i s t e d in a l l R-l zones; ROSC, 1988) 
4 
All R-l Zones allow the following land uses as a permitted use: 
Agriculture, Dwelling - Single Family, and Home Occupation Category I & II 
(Revised Ordinances of Sandy City, 1988, Chapter 15-7, all R-l zones inclusive) 
5
 §15-21-11 Use Of Land, Building And Structures. No land shall be used 
or occupied and no building or structure shall be designed, erected, altered, 
used or occupied for any use except those uses specifically permitted on the land 
upon which the building or structure is located or erected or use established as 
permitted in the regulations for the district in which said land is located. 
(R.O.S.C., 1988) 
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• The Life Safety Code requires that facilities for short term guests (called 
lodging houses by the Life Safety Code) include additional escape, 
protection, alarm, fire separation, and extinguishment provisions that are 
not required in a building to be used for single family use. 
• The state law authorizes the County to require rental facilities for short 
term guests renting for periods of 30 days or less (called transient rooms 
by the Sales and Use Tax Act) to collect and remit a special transient 
room tax to the State and County. Similar taxes are not imposed or 
authorized on persons occupying a private home for the purpose of 
residing for long periods of time. 
• The Sandy City Business Licensing Ordinance requires anyone carrying on 
any business within the City to be licensed. Further, businesses are not to 
be carried on in residences unless they meet the qualifications for a home 
occupation license. Some of the qualifications include: 1. that the business 
must be accessory (secondary and incidental) to the primary use of the 
dwelling as a residence; 2. that it can only be carried on by a bona fide 
resident of the dwelling; and 3. that it does not interfere or disrupt the 
peace, quiet and domestic tranquility of the neighborhood by creating 
excessive noise, excessive traffic, nuisance (defined as annoying, injuring 
or endangering the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or more 
persons), fire hazard, safety hazard or other adverse effects of commercial 
uses. 
5. Additional basis for the staffs determination that Mr. Brown's use of the structure 
is not as a single family dwelling as contemplated by the zone is the way the 
owner treats these buildings himself. He charges and collects rent on a daily or 
weekly basis, he schedules tour buses and/or transport buses to stop at the house, 
he has business relationships with agencies to arrange rentals some of whom are 
transported to the dwellings by tour buses either to encourage them to promote the 
site or to deliver them or renters to and from the site. 
6. Also, the neighborhoods are affected significantly differently than by the use of 
the structure as a single family dwelling, including: 1. late night, loud partying 
(both inside and outside the structure); 2. numerous vehicles entering and leaving 
the neighborhoods; 3. little or no responsiblity or accountability by the occupants 
to those who their behavior is affecting; 4. strangers, constantly changing, in their 
neighborhoods; 5. no ability to develop community relationships with occupants. 
Conclusion 
There is substantial, rational basis for the City's determination that the use of a 
dwelling as a place of public accommodation, renting it on a daily or weekly basis, 
is not an allowed use in a single family (R-1) zone. The City Council has estabUshed 
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strict regulations that specify the uses allowed in such zones. Accommodations for 
short term guests are either not allowed in R-l zones (motel/hotel) or are strictly 
regulated (bed and breakfast) with which regulations Mr. Browns use does not 
comply. Clearly the objectives of the City Council in designating specific uses that 
were allowed in the residential zones, setting forth the purpose of residential zones, 
and stating standards for businesses to locate in residential zones (home occupations), 
are an attempt to avoid the mixing together of industrial, commercial, business and 
residential uses. 
The staff has rationally construed those ordinances to maintain the character of the 
single family neighborhood. Other City, State, and County regulations support the 
City's determination that such rental facilities are not single family uses, as does Mr. 
Brown's treatment of the facilities, and the impact on the neighbors. 
State law and City ordinance requires that the Applicant bear the burden to prove to 
the Board that an error has been made by establishing that there is no rational basis 
exists for the staffs determination. The City has demonstrated that there is 
substantial, rational basis for its decision, therefore the appeal must fail. 
Assigned Planner: Reviewed by: 
Brok Armantrout 
Zoning Administrator 
NOTE: Any appeal of the decision of the Board of Adjustment must be made within thirty 
[30] days to the appropriate District Court of the State of Utah. Copies of the case 
file, including all evidence submitted will be made available to interested parties. You 
may make a copy of the audio tape of the proceedings at our offices located at 10000 
Centennial Parkway, suite 210, Sandy, Utah. 
- Page 4 -
0 0 0 1 8 
